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WHAT'S A NICE COMPANY LIKE GOLDMAN SACHS DOING IN THE SUPREME
COURT? HOW SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS RIP OFF ORDINARY
INVESTORS—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
RICHARD A. BOOTH*
ABSTRACT
This essay considers the issues raised in the latest securities fraud class action
to reach the Supreme Court—Goldman Sachs v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System—
and finds that the claims asserted therein against Goldman Sachs on behalf of openmarket buyers of its common stock are claims that should have been asserted on
behalf of Goldman Sachs (by means of a derivative action) and against the individuals
who caused the losses at issue. The losses suffered by individual buyers of Goldman
Sachs stock during the extraordinarily long forty-month alleged fraud period are
minimal if they exist at all. Moreover, the law is quite clear that claims on behalf of
the company arising from the same constellation of facts should take precedence
over any claims on behalf of individual buyers. Yet the practice that has evolved is
the opposite: class claims take priority and company claims are settled for nonmonetary governance reforms of dubious value rather than for real money. The
forces that have led to this classic example of market failure are both fascinating and
sinister. But the bottom line is that ordinary investors—such as investors in welldiversified mutual funds and index funds—end up losing far more than they gain
from class actions. Indeed, index fund investors effectively pay out about twenty
dollars for every dollar they recover. Thus, the best hope for reforming the system
is for index funds to step up and intervene to assert the interests of diversified
investors in favor of litigating such claims as derivative actions rather than as class
actions.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 1967, the Supreme Court has heard sixty-eight cases relating to Rule 10b5, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) catch-all anti-fraud rule, which
has been interpreted to permit investors to sue for damages when they are deceived
by a misstatement of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security. That is more than one case every year for a court that decides only about
eighty cases in a year. Securities fraud must be rampant. Or else something is awry
with how the law works.
The latest such case—Goldman Sachs v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System
(ATRS)—was argued on March 29. It arose because Goldman Sachs (GS) stock
price fell from about $184 (as of April 15, 2010) to about $134 (as of June 10, 2010)
in part because of an enforcement action filed by the SEC against the company on
April 16, 2010.1 Plaintiff buyers of GS common stock (ticker: GS) argue that they
were defrauded because the company held itself out as “dedicated to complying fully
with the letter and spirit of the laws, rules and ethical principles that govern us” and
affirmed that “[o]ur continued success depends upon unswerving adherence to this
standard . . . .”2 Plaintiffs claim that this was a lie, that GS stock was overpriced as
a result, and that as buyers they paid too much when they bought. According to
plaintiffs, the lie was revealed when the SEC filed suit based on the firm’s marketing
of a collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) called ABACUS. To be specific,
plaintiffs claim that the SEC action exposed GS as a firm that was anything but
committed to lofty ethical principles. Thus, statements to the contrary were
misrepresentations.
There is no doubt that much (or most) of the price decrease in GS was
attributable to the government crackdown. GS ultimately paid a $550 million fine
to settle the matter with the SEC.3 Nevertheless, ATRS claims that revelation of the
firm's true colors caused the loss they suffered at least in part and that they should
be made whole to the tune of about $50 per share.
The Goldman Sachs case involves the rebuttable fraud-on-the-market (FOTM)
presumption, by which buyers may be presumed to have relied on a false statement
of material fact if it affected market price.4 If the false statement causes market price
to rise or remain too high, and the price falls when the truth comes out—at the time
of a corrective disclosure—buyers may sue to recover their losses.5 To be clear, the SEC
1. See Arkansas Teacher Ret. Sys. (ATRS) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 955 F.3d 254 (2d
Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 950 (2020) [hereinafter ATRS].
2. Id. at 258–59.
3. See Steven M. Davidoff et al., The SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and Fiduciary
Duties in Investment Banking, 37 J. CORP. L. 529, 539–40 (2012).
4. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 228 (1988).
5. Note that a securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5 may arise from the cover-up of
either bad news or good news. In the former case, the plaintiff class comprises those who
bought during the fraud period, while in the latter case the plaintiff class comprises those who
sold during the fraud period. There are notable examples of good-news fraud cases (with seller
classes). See generally Basic, 485 U.S. at 224; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
155 (1972); S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). But studies show that
there about sixty bad-news cases for every one good news case. In other words, the
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did not sue GS because ABACUS was inconsistent with statements about the firm's
commitment to compliance. Rather, the SEC sued because ABACUS was created
in part to enable one firm client to sell it short (at what turned out to be a substantial
gain) and thus violated the firm's duty to its customers who bought the product. But
the SEC enforcement action gave plaintiffs the corrective disclosure they needed to
invoke the FOTM theory—albeit a corrective disclosure in the guise of an event (the
SEC filing) rather than any express admission by the company that earlier statements
had been wrong.6 Thus, plaintiffs sought to recover from the company for the
difference between the price they paid and the market price following corrective
disclosure—after the truth came out.
The Goldman Sachs case differs from an ordinary securities fraud class action
claim involving an alleged misrepresentation about earnings or business prospects.
For example, suppose Acme Blasting Cap Company (ABC) stock trades at $20 per
share because the market thinks it will generate return of $2 per share. That is, the
market values the company at ten times earnings. In a conference call with analysts,
the CEO confirms that expectation—saying that the company is on track to make
its numbers even though the CEO knows that there is a fifty-fifty chance that
earnings will be only one dollar per share when reported (because an important
customer has indicated it might cancel a big order which might or might not be
offset by an order from another customer). Three months later the company
announces earnings of one dollar per share. And stock price immediately falls to
$10 per share. Under Rule 10b-5, buyers who bought ABC stock during the threemonth fraud period may sue as a class to recover the difference between the price
they paid and market price following corrective disclosure.7 In other words, buyers
as a group may sue the company to recover their loss of $10 per share. 8 There is no
need for each class member to prove reliance on the statement by the CEO—which
was heard only by a handful of analysts. Indeed, there is no need for any plaintiff to
prove reliance, which means that such actions may be litigated as class actions. And
that is important because few individual buyers will have lost enough to bother to
make a claim.9 Without a class action remedy, most such fraud will go unavenged.
Or so the argument goes.

overwhelming majority of SFCAs involve the cover up of bad news (with buyer classes).
Accordingly, the discussion here assumes the context of a bad news case with a buyer class.
6. The courts have recognized that an event may serve as corrective disclosure because
otherwise a company could avoid any stockholder claim simply by remaining silent and refusing
to acknowledge any earlier misstatement as incorrect. See Richard A. Booth, Loss Causation and the
Materialization of Risk Doctrine in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 75 BUS. LAW. 1791, 1792 n. 3 (2019).
7. More precisely, the price following corrective disclosure is deemed (by statute) to be the
“the mean trading price . . . during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the
information correcting the misstatement or omission . . . is disseminated to the market.” See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 104–67, tit. I, § 21D(a)(7)(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(e)(1) (West 2010). The history and rationale for this rule (adopted as part of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) is itself quite fascinating. See Richard A. Booth, OOPs!
The Inherent Ambiguity of Out-of-Pocket Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 46 J. CORP. L. 319,
322 n. 9 (2020).
8. They may sue the company because the CEO is presumed to speak for the company.
Ergo, it was the company that deceived them. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc.,
513 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2008). This point is discussed at length in Richard A. Booth,
Deconstructing Scienter, 15 VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming in 2021).
9. Indeed, the federal class action rule, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP), was adopted in 1966 in its current form with securities litigation in mind, albeit most
cases arise under the 1933 Act and not under Rule 10b-5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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The ultimate question in Goldman Sachs is whether the alleged corrective
disclosure made any difference at all to stock price. Under a 2014 SCOTUS
decision—Halliburton II—the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to rebut
the FOTM presumption before the action can proceed as a class action. 10 GS argues
that the price decrease was attributable to the SEC announcement and not to any
revelation that its earlier generic statements about compliance were false. Indeed,
during oral argument, Justice Alito suggested that such statements were akin to the
claim, "We are a nice company," and unlikely to matter much to investors. 11
Moreover, GS had acknowledged all along that its business entails conflicts of
interest that require active monitoring and had done so in the same filings in which
it claimed to be committed to compliance. 12 Finally, and probably most important,
the facts relating to ABACUS were well known to the market before the SEC filed
suit.13
If the loss was caused wholly by a new development (such as the SEC action),
there can be no claim, because there was no lie or cover-up. But a three-judge panel
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that even if most of the loss was
attributable to the SEC enforcement action, the presumption remains as long as some
of the price decrease can be attributed to corrective disclosure.14
I.

WHAT IS THE QUESTION?

To be clear, the Goldman Sachs case raises several related issues. For one, can
an event serve as corrective disclosure? The answer to that question is pretty well
settled in the affirmative, but SCOTUS has never expressly agreed. For another,
what does it take to rebut the presumption of price impact—the presumption that
a particular item of misinformation affected a market price? This is the narrow
question before the Court. More precisely, the question is whether offering some
rebuttal evidence is enough or whether the plaintiff must offer other evidence to
rebut the rebuttal. But these questions imply a logically prior question: what exactly
do we mean by price impact in this context?
Stock prices fall for all sorts of reasons. How do we know how much market
price fell because the GS lied about its ethical standards and how much it fell for
other reasons—like the government crackdown on practices previously thought to
be kosher? Suppose I buy a used Ford Pinto for $1000 from a guy in a plaid suit
and discover that I overpaid by $100 because the mileage had been rolled back. On
my way to the dealership to demand a refund, I get bumped from behind, and the
gas tank explodes, totaling the car. Can I sue the guy in the plaid suit for the entire
$1000 purchase price?15

10. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 258 (2014) [hereinafter
Halliburton II].
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher
Ret. Sys. 141 S. Ct. 1512 (2021) (No. 20-222); see id. at 36, 62 (question by Justice Roberts), 38
(question by Justice Thomas).
12. See ATRS, 955 F.3d 254, 273–74 (2d Cir. 2020).
13. See Davidoff, et al., supra note 3, at 539–40.
14. ATRS, 955 F.3d at 277–78; see also Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79, 104–05 (2d
Cir. 2017).
15. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 40, Goldman Sachs, 141 S. Ct. 1512 (No. 20222), where Justice Breyer seems to raise a similar question.
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The test in a case like Goldman Sachs is (or should be) whether the market would
have reacted to corrective disclosure in the absence of the triggering event–—if the
company had simply fessed up as to the alleged lie. Suppose the firm had said: "We
sometimes provide (and make markets in) financial products for which there is
investor demand even though as a firm we might not choose to invest in such
products." How much would stock price have dropped? Not much (if any) since
the statement is an apt description of a large segment of the securities business. It
is as if Captain Renault arrived on the scene and exclaimed, "I'm shocked . . . shocked
to find that market making is going on in here." Whatever the (minimal) decrease that
might follow such a disclosure, that is the amount of price inflation—the excess
price caused by the (supposed) deception.
Moreover, the remainder of the loss beyond correction of any price inflation is
a loss suffered by the firm. If GS employees violated the law by dealing in such
financial products, it is the company that should recover from individual wrongdoers
for the harm they did to company reputation (not to mention the loss from the fine).
Indeed, the SEC sued both GS and its vice president Fabrice Tourre (AKA Fabulous
Fab) who designed and marketed ABACUS and who later paid an individual fine of
more than $825,000.16 To be sure, a company is unlikely to sue its own employees.
But there is a mechanism by which company stockholders can compel the company
do precisely that: the stockholders may sue derivatively to recover from the individual
wrongdoers on behalf of the company. If the derivative action succeeds, the
company recovers and stock price is restored for the benefit of all the stockholders.
Admittedly, it can be a bit difficult to grasp the idea that GS as a firm suffered
most of the harm in this case—especially since the firm likely made a ton of money
from ABACUS. Nevertheless, the firm is an institution comprising more than
30,000 professional employees and thousands of stockholders. 17 Withal, it is also a
systemically important institution. It is the sixty-sixth largest company in the S&P
500.18 As such, GS is a significant cog in the machine that is the U.S. economy–—
not to mention the banking system thereof. To be sure, one might argue that the
firm has deep pockets and can afford to make buyer stockholders whole. But the
firm–—which was worth more than $93B before the SEC action was announced–
—lost more than $25B in value as a result of the events by which plaintiffs claim
$13 billion in damages.19 At some point, one must worry about whether the firm
can survive—as perhaps the Department of Justice should have worried about the
accounting firm Arthur Andersen in the wake of the Enron debacle. 20
II.

SAY IT AIN'T SO LLOYD

16. See Nate Raymond & Jonathan Stempel, Big Fine Imposed on Ex-Goldman Trader Tourre in
SEC Case, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-goldmansachs-sectourre/big-fine-imposed-on-ex-goldman-trader-tourre-in-sec-case-idUSBREA2B11220140312
[https://perma.cc/BB33-WMPU].
17. See In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., Civil Action No. CIV.A., 5215VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
18. See S&P 500 Companies by Weight, SLICKCHARTS, https://www.slickcharts.com/sp500
[https://perma.cc/SWW3-UN5D].
19. See ATRS, 955 F.3d at 259-60.
20. The firm, Arthur Anderson, was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, of obstructing an SEC proceeding; the Fifth Circuit affirmed and the
Supreme Court eventually reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See generally Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
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Some of the lost GS value came from the SEC fine and attendant expenses.
And some may have come from tarnish to the GS brand. But it is difficult to believe
that these losses accounted for more than a billion or so of the $13 billion claim. 21
The remainder of the loss almost certainly came from lost prospects because the
CMO party was busted. In other words, before the SEC crackdown, the market
assumed that GS (and other banks) would eventually get back to business and
making money as they had before.
To summarize, there are three or four possible sources of loss in the Goldman
Sachs case:
•
•
•
•

fines and attendant legal expenses
diminished prospects for profit going forward (future earnings)
reputational harm (loss of trust)
correction of price inflation (exposure of unethical practices)

The first is the most concrete and is clearly derivative in nature. The second is
almost certainly the largest, but it is unclear whether anyone can recover for this
element of loss which came from fundamental changes to the business of banking.
The last two items are more difficult to prove and to measure. But the important
point is that they are two sides of the same coin—two different ways of describing
the same element of loss.
As asserted three times by plaintiff counsel at oral argument, GS traded at a
premium as compared to shares of competitors. 22 Thus, the claim is that plaintiff
buyers paid more for GS than they would have paid for shares of competitor banks
all else equal. Assuming this allegation is true (as we and the courts must do for the
sake of argument), then the claim must be that the market was fooled into thinking
that GS was better. But it is also possible that GS really was better and squandered
its competitive advantage by marketing ABACUS and running afoul of the SEC. In
other words, the superior reputation of GS was either illusory to begin with or it was
real but lost because of bad business behavior.
The first possibility–—that the firm's competitive advantage was illusory—
might or might not give rise to a fraud claim. If the firm's superior reputation is the
product of demonstrably false advertising, it might constitute fraud. But if the firm's
superior reputation is the product of caché that simply evolved on its own like the
latest fashion—firm-specific irrational exuberance— it can just as easily disappear
of its own accord and likely will do so eventually.
The second possibility—that the firm's competitive advantage was real and was
squandered—would certainly give rise to a derivative claim. Indeed, it is the essence
of a claim for reputational harm. The only difference is that the decrease is one
from a superior reputation to a normal reputation rather than a decrease from a
normal reputation to an inferior reputation.
In other words, what is unusual about the Goldman Sachs case is that it involves
a firm that was seen as superior to others—one that returned to earth (so to speak)
when it was revealed to be merely mortal (or mix your own metaphor).
It is helpful here to consider an analogy involving bond ratings. Imagine
company “XYZ” has bonds rated AA while its competitors' bonds are merely rated
21. See ATRS, 955 F.3d at 259-60.
22. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 62, 69, 88, Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Arkansas
Teacher Ret. Sys. 141 S. Ct. 1512 (2021) (No. 20-222).
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A. It turns out that some of the past profits booked by XYZ have come from illegal
operations. As a result, XYZ bonds are downgraded to B. In retrospect, it is unclear
why the XYZ bonds were ever rated AA. But they might never have been
downgraded if not for revelation of the illegal operations. It is also quite clear that
the further demotion to B (junk bond status) is the result of bad business behavior
and a loss of trust.
The Goldman Sachs case is similar in that the loss may derive either from the
dissipation of a distinct advantage or from affirmative punishment by the market (or
both). But the argument that GS was viewed as special complicates the analysis. If
the firm had a genuine edge that was squandered by miscreant employees on
ABACUS, the harm is pretty clearly derivative. But if the edge was illusory—derived
from some intangible aura of mysterious origin that the firm sought to exploit for
as long as possible—it is unclear that any claim will lie. Investors might have wanted
to know that all glory if fleeting, but for the firm to broadcast the point would have
eliminated its edge in the meantime. Indeed, one could argue that the firm had a
duty to exploit its undeserved reputation for as long as possible.
Still, if the loss derives from the market's belief that the firm was better than
other similar firms, the question is whether the market fooled itself or if GS fooled
the market. If the firm did something positively deceptive to create or perpetuate a
false image—like bribing the rating agency—there might be a fraud claim to be made
out. But the claim would be akin to one for the difference between the yield on AA
bonds and A bonds—the loss caused by the mistaken bond rating. The further loss
because of the further downgrade from A to B represents affirmative punishment
by the market. It would clearly give rise to a derivative claim (as would a claim by
the company to recoup the bribe in the example).
The market will tell us whether it perceives any such fraud. If GS merely reverts
to the mean—as to the mere A rating it should have had all along—and the market
does not punish the company for its mendacity, the market must not think the
company did anything wrong. No harm. No foul. To be sure, buyers of GS may
have paid too much because the stock was overpriced for a while. That is always a
risk with investing. In other words, if there is no extra loss there is no fraud. But if
there is extra loss, it gives rise to a derivative claim. So no matter how you slice it,
at least some of the claim is derivative.
III.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

Although claims such as the one in Goldman Sachs belong at least in part to the
company, the prevailing practice is that class action plaintiffs can recover individually
for their entire loss. The problem is that if buyers recover from the company,
existing stockholders lose twice: They suffer (derivatively) the loss suffered by the
company and they suffer again when the firm pays the buyers. In effect, the recovery
that goes to the buyers comes from non-buyer (legacy) stockholders. It is the
financial equivalent of a pick-six in football.
To make matters worse, the prospect of payout by the company causes stock
price to fall that much more because of the payout itself. And it does so immediately.
The market does not wait to see if a class action is filed. So if buyers can recover
from the company, the amount they stand to recover is magnified by their own claim
for damages through a bizarre echo effect—rather like the feedback that results from
holding a microphone too close to a speaker. This echo (or feedback) effect also
helps explain why plaintiff lawyers prefer class actions to derivative actions. Since
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plaintiff lawyers get paid a share of the recovery—since they work on commission
(as it were)—they are naturally inclined to proceed by class action rather than
derivative action. It is not up to the plaintiffs simply to claim the claim (so to speak).
The court decides to whom a claim belongs especially in the context of
representative litigation such as a class action where the interests of absent parties
are at stake.
This is an important point and not just some throw-away legal truism. Both
lawyers and layfolk tend to gloss over the procedural step by which the court decides
whether a case may proceed as a class action. A plaintiff has no entitlement to litigate
on behalf of a class. The court must certify that the action is the proper subject of a
class action (and that the plaintiff is a proper plaintiff to maintain it) precisely
because the rights of others are at stake. If the action settles—as it almost always
will do if it proceeds—all of the absent class members will be bound unless they
choose affirmatively to opt out. Thus, the rules prohibit settlement without approval
of the court. Indeed, the rules also prohibit dropping the case (voluntary dismissal)
unless the court approves. On reflection, these are extraordinary rules. They seem
to fly in the face of the idea that everyone deserves their day in court. Quite to the
contrary, the court can decide if you are worthy to make a claim. A plaintiff must in
effect prove their case before a court will allow them to prove their case. And just
to be clear, there is no hyperbole here: Goldman Sachs is a case in point. The issue
before SCOTUS is not liability itself. The (well disguised) issue is whether the case
may proceed as a class action.
To add further irony, defendant companies are unlikely to protest that the
action should be a derivative action. Companies and their managers would rather
circle the wagons against a common foe than form up a circular firing squad by
seeking company recovery from its own managers. To make matters even worse,
insurance typically covers class claims against the company, but often does not cover
derivative claims by which managers are found liable to the company. In short, no
one has an incentive to get it right. Economists call it market failure.
So how might the courts fix the problem since the parties are not likely to do
so? As it turns out, the rule governing class actions—Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure—provides a solution. It says (in effect) that a class action should
be the last resort. If there is any other equally good way to resolve a dispute, that
alternative trumps a class action. To be precise, the Rule says a court can certify an
action for damages as a class action only if proceeding by class action is superior to
all other ways of resolving the issues. Ties always go to any alternative mode of
proceeding. The possession arrow always points away from class actions.
Even in the absence of such unambiguous guidance, it is clearly preferable for
the company to recover. In the Goldman Sachs case, the loss from the fine and the
concomitant decline in the value of the business is a loss suffered by all of the
stockholders and not merely those who bought their stock during the fraud period.
Since it was the business that was harmed by the malfeasance of its managers (if
any). It is clearly more efficient for the company to recover a lump sum that
redounds to the benefit of all stockholders pro rata than it is to send each stockholder
a check that in many cases will cost more to process than it is worth.
Moreover, and more importantly, derivative recovery mitigates any class claim
that remains. To the extent the company is likely to recover, stock price falls that
much less in the first place. It follows that if some of the claim is derivative, we
should address the derivative claim first and see what loss remains (if any). Again,
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some of the claim will always be derivative because it is implausible that the company
will not have suffered some harm (as a company) if it can be proved that someone
in authority committed a fraud such that the company can be held liable. So if there
is a class claim, there will always be a derivative claim. But the converse is not true:
there need not be a fraud claim. It is quite possible for a derivative claim to arise
without any individual claim. That is, it is easy to imagine a case in which
compensation to the company would make every stockholder whole.
Goldman Sachs is just such a case. It is scarcely conceivable that those who
bought the stock during the fraud period suffered any additional compensable loss
beyond the claim that might be asserted by the company. The Second Circuit itself
implicitly recognized that most of the loss came from the SEC crackdown. In other
words, the court certified the class action on the thinnest possible justification—that
even if stock price were restored by company recovery, some compensable loss might
remain from the cover-up of the truth.
IV.

THE LAW AND THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS

Arguably, Goldman Sachs is an easy case because the market would not likely
have reacted to the supposed corrective disclosure standing alone—in the absence
of the SEC action. In a more typical case like that of ABC described above, fraudperiod buyers would have avoided some loss if the CEO had disclosed that there
was a fifty-fifty chance that earnings would be $1 per share rather than $2 per share
as expected. All else equal, stock price should have fallen to $15 at that point
although it later fell to $10 when it turned out that the worst-case scenario had come
to pass.
In a class action under Rule 10b-5, buyers can recover the $10 difference
between what they paid ($20) and stock price following corrective disclosure ($10).
But Goldman Sachs reveals a subtle issue. Should buyers recover their full $10 loss or
just the $5 difference between what they paid and what they would have paid if the
market had known all the facts?
Buyers would no doubt argue that they lost $10 and should recover in full. But
if so, they are better off because of the fraud (so called) than they would have been
if there had been no fraud. If the CEO had told the whole truth and buyers had
paid $15, they would have no claim based on the further decline to $10. To be sure,
the buyers might argue that they would not have bought at all at $15. But that gets
into speculation about exactly why each buyer bought and runs afoul of the spirit of
the FOTM presumption, which quite sensibly ignores individual reliance and
presumes that investors rely on market prices to be fairly set.
While it seems clear that buyer claims should be limited to the $5 per share by
which price was inflated, it is not at all clear that the company should compensate
buyers simply because the CEO reassured the market that the company was on track
to make its numbers. Even if we allow that the CEO was reckless in saying that
everything was hunky-dory with the business, the question remains whether
investors really want to be compensated when they buy a mispriced stock.
Most investors are well-diversified. They hold the stocks they hold through a
mutual fund or pension plan that holds the stocks of 500 or more different
companies. Indeed, the single largest segment of the investor population (by value)
invests through index funds and does so because it affords maximum diversification
for a minimal management fee.
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Moreover, it is arguable that a reasonable (retail) investor must diversify since
by doing so one can avoid company-specific risk without any reduction in expected
return. The law of large numbers guarantees it. And the iron law of investing is that
one must demand more return in exchange for taking more risk. Thus, if one can
avoid some risk for the same return, one should do so.
Diversification is (or was) the only free lunch in the market. But since
diversified investors take less risk, they are willing to pay more for stocks, which
drives up prices generally. It follows that investors who decline to diversify pay too
much. The market has eaten their free lunch. To be sure, individual investors are
free to follow whatever strategy they want to follow. But that does not make it
reasonable not to diversify. Since the law seeks to protect reasonable investors, the
courts should interpret the law with their interests in mind. Indeed, that is what the
courts profess to do.
The point here is that index investors do not care about timing losses. Because
they are diversified, they are equally likely to buy or sell a stock that is overpriced or
underpriced. Over the long haul, a purchase of a stock that is overpriced will be
offset by a purchase of a stock that is underpriced. Diversified investors have
effectively hedged away the risk of mispricing. They are effectively insured—albeit
self-insured—against such worries.
The truth is bound to come out at some point. And the price decline will be
what it will be. Que sera sera. The loss will happen to someone. As in musical chairs,
the loss will fall where it will falls when the music stops.
The idea that index investors should disfavor class actions because they do not
need protection against mispricing is an understatement (which itself is an
understatement). Index investors should be passionately opposed to class actions
because when the company pays buyers, the company will decline in value by the
amount of the payout. In effect, legacy holders—those who held the subject stock
from before the fraud period—pay class-member buyers. Moreover, because
diversified investors tend to trade very little—and mostly do so for purposes of
portfolio balancing—they will almost always hold more stock from before the fraud
than they bought during the fraud period.
To be specific, annual trading by index funds at most about 2% of holdings by
value.23 By comparison, market-wide turnover for all NYSE stocks is about 54%
annually. 24 Thus, for every dollar effectively paid out by index funds through value
lost from class action settlements, less than four cents is recovered—months or
years later—and some of that goes to the plaintiff attorneys that represent the class.
So the cost of class actions is a deadweight loss even in the best case. In practice, it
is worse because index funds pay about twenty cents for every cent they recoup. It
makes no sense to sue for $1,000 if it costs $25,000 to do so.
Admittedly, investors who choose a few good stocks—stock-pickers—might
see some value in the extant system. They must always worry that they will be the
chump who buys at just the wrong time. And the result might be financial ruin. But
even they will sometimes be holders rather than buyers. Indeed, they are equally

23. See PDR Services LLC, SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust Prospectus, SSGA 23 (Jan. 14, 2021)
https://www.ssga.com/us/en/institutional/etfs/resources/doc-viewer#spy&prospectus
[https://perma.cc/34Z2-PS73].
24. See United States NYSE: Turnover, CEIC,
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/united-states/nyse-turnover [https://perma.cc/6A2M-6U7J].
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likely to lose as win from class actions (although they win more when they win than
they lose when they lose). But it is not clear that even undiversified stock pickers
should favor retention of a class action remedy.
Recognizing the illogic of the circularity inherent in securities fraud class
actions, some scholars have suggested that it actually makes sense for holders to pay
buyers (as in a class action) because as holders they are in some sense responsible
for the fraud perpetrated on innocent new investors by the companies they own—
perhaps by analogy to early Madoff investors who depended on later victims even
though they may not have known it. But the analogy breaks down where the
company itself has sold no stock and gains nothing from the so-called fraud.
Yet another common response to the foregoing story is that defendant
companies do not really pay the settlement in a class action. Rather, settlements are
almost always fully funded by insurance. The argument seems to be why should we
not let disappointed stock-pickers recoup some of their losses if the company does
not pay anyway? The easy reply—as every first-year law student learns—is that
insurance is irrelevant to the merits of a dispute. More important, it is defendant
companies that pay for the insurance. And the insurance company must make a
profit. So it is even more expensive in the grand scheme if insurance companies
cover the claims. There would be no need for companies to buy such insurance
coverage but for the fact of class actions.
Still, another common retort is that law is irrelevant because cases always settle.
Some laws—like junk genes—do not really matter. But it is no excuse for bad legal
doctrine that it seldom dictates the outcome of a trial. Bargaining happens in the
shadow of the law. The law as interpreted by the courts tells us what plaintiffs can
claim in damages and thus determines where settlement negotiations begin. So it is
important to get the rules right even if cases almost never go to trial.
V.

HOW DID WE GET INTO THIS MESS?

How did this counterproductive remedy—which is unique to U.S. law—ever
evolve? The answer lies in the history of federal securities law. Under the Securities
Act of 1933, investors who buy shares in an initial public offering can recover any
loss they suffer as a result of a material misstatement or omission in the prospectus.
No questions asked. The company must disgorge the funds it raises by false
pretenses. That is a perfectly sensible rule and one that ultimately assures that capital
flows where it will do the most good. But suppose an already-public company sells
additional shares in a subsequent offering. The shares bought by a new investor
may be new shares or existing shares. The disgorgement remedy applies only to new
shares that are part of the new offering because the company is liable only to give
back the ill-gotten funds. So the buyer must be able to show she bought new shares
not existing shares.25 But clever plaintiff lawyers and sympathetic courts found a
solution. If buyers could show that a false statement in the prospectus caused the
stock in question to trade at a higher price than should have obtained, then a fraud
claim might lie in addition to the no-questions-asked disgorgement claim under the
1933 Act. The claim need not be limited by the amount of a new offering. It is a
short step to the system we have today. If buyers can be compensated even as to
shares not part of an offering, there is no reason why the remedy should be limited
to situations in which there happens to be an offering in progress. In other words,
25. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271–72 (2d Cir. 1967).
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there is no obvious reason why the misstatement must appear in a prospectus. Any
public misstatement should do. And the securities fraud class action was born.
It is understandable how class actions came to be. Once upon a time, they may
have been a good idea. But we have outgrown the need for them as investors have
become ever more diversified. With the growth of mutual funds since the 1970s
and the advent of index funds in the meantime, ordinary investors have no need for
such a remedy—which today does nothing but to reduce aggregate return.
The real mystery is why securities fraud class actions survive when they disserve
most investors—especially the most rational investors who eschew stock-picking
and active trading by investing in index funds. One answer is that investors do not
understand how they are getting fleeced by the system. When a fat settlement check
arrives in the mail—a shiny new penny—it is easy to lose sight of who really pays.
A still better answer is that the system works great for plaintiff lawyers whose cut
can be 20% or more of the pot which has totaled more than $100 billion since
1996.26 It works out pretty well for defense lawyers too.
Indeed, class actions work all the better for plaintiff lawyers because a class
action magnifies the damages through the echo effect noted above. If you do the
math, it turns out that a 10% decrease in stock price becomes a 20% decrease if the
plaintiff class includes 50% of the stockholders. And if the class includes 90% of
stockholders, a 10% drop in stock price becomes a 100% drop, wiping out all of the
value of the defendant company—all because of the echo effect.27 To be completely
clear, the echo effect arises when the law works as it is meant to work. It is no mere
by-product of market over-reaction to bad news. Rather, it is the natural side-effect
of a cure that is worse than the disease.
VI.

WHAT ABOUT DETERRENCE?

Even legal scholars who like the idea of class actions—because they see the
need for some sort of private remedy that deters public companies from lying to the
market – mostly agree that the extant system leads to excessive litigation. The
prospect of a massive award equal to as much as the full amount of the price decrease
times the number of shares outstanding encourages plaintiff lawyers to sue and
causes defendants to settle any case that both survives a motion to dismiss and is
certified as a class action. As a result, only a handful of cases have ever gone to trial.
Some have argued that you can never over-deter fraud.28 But the cost of overdeterrence is real. If the punishment for misspeaking to the market is too extreme,
companies will stop speaking to the market except when absolutely required to do
so. Investors will have less information than they might otherwise enjoy.
Nevertheless, without some sort of remedy, fraud might become (more) rampant.
26. See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Settlements—2019 Review and Analysis, at
3 https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements2019-Review-and-Analysis [https://perma.cc/2G8L-RGZD].
27. Incidentally (or not), although the echo effect magnifies the damages in bad news
cases—in which the cover-up involves negative information that causes stock price to fall and
buyers to sue—the echo effect shrinks the damages in good news cases involving seller plaintiffs.
In such cases, the prospect of payout mitigates the price effect of the good news. As a result, bad
news cases outnumber good news cases by about sixty to one. See Richard A. Booth, The End of
the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 22 (2007).
28. See James C. Spindler, We Have a Consensus on Fraud on the Market–And It’s Wrong, 7
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 67, 114 (2017).
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Either we compensate investors for their losses or we do not. It is not obvious that
there is any middle ground.
One last argument for compensating disappointed stock-pickers (as in the
current system) is that traders might stop trading if they are exposed to the risk of
loss without the potential for compensation. 29 The market would become less
efficient. This argument is a variation on the efficiency paradox which has it that if
investors really believed the market to be efficient, they would stop doing research
about the value of stocks and the market would become inefficient. Zeno lives.
There are several responses.
First, it is unlikely that traders care much about a class action remedy. At best
they will recoup a few cents on the dollar months or years later. So, it is unlikely
that the lack of a remedy would discourage trading even at the margin because the
remedy is quite remote (if not random). But even if we allow that stock-picking
might be unduly discouraged, we should consider whether class actions unduly
encourage stock-picking. If I know it makes no difference whether I do my
homework, why should I do it? I can trade based on hunches, tips, and whims,
making the market more volatile and less efficient than it would be in the absence
of a class action remedy.30 It is really quite curious that scholars who support class
actions emphasize the need to protect stock-pickers to the exclusion of worries
about subsidizing their activities. Indeed, the FOTM theory positively encourages
investors to trust market prices and thus discourages diversification at the margin.
So proponents of index funds might argue just as strenuously that class actions
encourage irrational investment strategies as opponents of index funds argue that
they undermine market efficiency. The end result is a draw. Second, any reduction
in market efficiency is bound to be self-correcting. If a significant number of traders
stop looking for mispriced stocks, mispricing will become more common, attracting
more traders. The market will equilibrate. In other words, the efficiency paradox is
no paradox at all. It is simply a description of how markets work. In the end, it
seems likely that class actions play at most a minor role in keeping the market
efficient. But they play a much more significant role from a management point of
view in the success or demise of individual businesses. In other words, the benefits
for investors are minimal, but the costs for defendant companies are significant.
Quite aside from the foregoing arguments about why traders and stock pickers
do not need a remedy, an equally powerful argument can that index investors need
class actions to be abolished. Class actions are a drain on aggregate returns. They
do nothing more than move money from one group of investors to another minus
a cut for plaintiff attorneys. More important, class actions aggravate the situation by
diverting what should be derivative recovery to class recovery. The question is: who
should prevail in the class struggle between diversified and undiversified investors?
The answer is quite easy: since reasonable investors diversify, and since most
investors are indeed diversified, and since the risk of mispricing (or bad timing) is a
risk that ordinary stockholders can easily avoid through diversification, the case
against class actions is overwhelming. In the end, the biggest hang-up about getting
29. Cf. Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 140 (1994) (responding to the similarly common-but-flawed argument that limited liability is
intended to induce investment by permitting investors to avoid some of the risk of failure).
30. News of the occasional big recovery might create the impression that the remedy is
more robust than it really is—just as those who play the lottery tend to focus on big winners.
Note also the parallel to the moral risk argument about insurance and bank bail-outs: if I know I
am protected against loss, I will take more risk than I would do otherwise.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss6/4

16

Booth: What’s a Nice Company like Goldman Sachs Doing in the Supreme Cou

2021 WHAT’S A NICE COMPANY LIKE GOLDMAN SACHS DOING IN 87
THE SUPREME COURT?
rid of class actions—the remedy that almost everyone loves to hate—is the idea that
individual investors need to be compensated. But that idea derives from a false
analogy with disgorgement actions under the 1933 Act. Issuer companies almost
never gain from so-called securities fraud. So, there is nothing to disgorge. And
there is no demonstrable need to subsidize trading and stock-picking. Quite to the
contrary, there is every reason to discourage ordinary investors from both. And as
for deterrence, derivative actions offer a just-right Goldilocks solution. By holding
wrongdoers liable for the tangible harm they visit on their companies (such as SEC
fines), the law might instill a sense of individual responsibility that is missing with
the potential for a ludicrous award against the company that can be dismissed as a
form of big-game ambulance chasing.
Whatever we might decide about the need to compensate stock-pickers for
price inflation, it is clear that any derivative claim should be resolved first (if only
because it mitigates any direct claim). The harm from price inflation (if any) should
be the last to be addressed.
VII.

WHY DOESN’T SOMEBODY DO SOMETHING?

Why is it that no plaintiff law firm has built a practice seeking to displace class
actions and to capture the fees that go with derivative actions? The answer is that
they may have done so, but the results are contorted by a variety of factors that the
courts have failed to sort out and control. Indeed, it is quite common really for a
derivative action to be filed based on the same underlying facts as those giving rise
to a class action. But this naturally leads to confusion about what plaintiffs really
want. Those prosecuting the class action want the company to pay. Those
prosecuting the derivative action want the company to recover. It can make the
courts crazy. The Goldman Sachs case illustrates why the class action prevails. The
class action makes a claim for $13 billion in easily measured damages. But a
derivative action would make a claim to recoup $550 million from the fine plus
maybe legal fees paid by the company to defend itself against the SEC and perhaps
some difficult to calculate damage to company reputation. It is easy to imagine that
thinking ahead to when the time comes to apply to the court for attorney fees, the
lawyer for the derivative action might prefer a small share of big aggregate fee to the
whole of a much smaller fee.
To play with the numbers above, if we assume that the derivative action might
recover a billion or so for the company, and we assume that the fee will be 20% of
whatever amount is recovered, the class action might generate a fee of $2.6 billion
while the derivative action might generate a $200 million fee. The derivative lawyer
would be quite happy to take 10% of the class recovery in exchange for throwing
the game regarding the derivative action. Working backwards, the derivative lawyer
might agree to seek (or accept) non-monetary governance reforms on the part of the
corporation rather than to insist on a cash settlement for the benefit of the
corporation—which would raise all sorts of inscrutable questions about why the
company should both pay and recover). That way the derivative lawyer can credibly
claim to have obtained something of value for the corporation and thus to have
earned a share of the fee awarded by the court.
The question remains: why do investors continue to sue when it is against their
interest to do so? The answer is that plaintiff lawyers are very good at finding
investors who will lend their name to a lawsuit for a price. Up until about 2006,

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2022], Art. 4
88

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE

[Vol. 66

investors were often paid—quite illegally—to serve as plaintiffs. When that practice
was exposed, the leading plaintiff firm in the securities fraud class action business
was indicted. Name partners were disbarred and went to jail.31 Since 2006, most
such actions have been filed by union and public pension plans as representative
plaintiffs rather than by individual investors. The action against GS is a case in/on
point: the named plaintiff therein is ATRS. Needless to say, ATRS is a well-advised
and well-diversified institutional investor who should know better. But such
pension plans are typically governed by politicians to whom it is quite legal to make
campaign contributions. Moreover, and perhaps more important, those who run
such funds may generate even more political capital by going after big business and
extracting a big settlement. Indeed, in the Goldman Sachs case, those who run ATRS
can claim to have done something about the practices that led to the 2008 credit
crisis. That is not necessarily a bad thing. 32 But the fact remains that the cost that
falls on diversified investors far exceeds the benefits they receive. That looks a lot
like a breach of fiduciary duty to fund participants. 33
VIII.

STOP THE MADNESS

Now that we know the problem, how do we stop the cycle of self-destruction?
One noted critic has proposed that we dis-imply a private right of action under
Rule 10b-5.34 Since the SEC adopted the rule, the SEC can say what it means. The
problem with this solution is that the rule covers lots of other situations in which
we need a remedy—ranging from insider trading to broker-dealer churning of
customer accounts. Moreover, it is not necessary to mess with the meaning of fraud
if the courts will only do their job of prioritizing derivative actions. But the courts
and litigants are set in their ways. How do we disrupt the status quo?
One possibility is that index funds might opt out of class actions. But that does
not change the fact that any settlement will be paid by the company and thus will
come out of the pockets of all the stockholders. To forgo a share of any recovery
exacerbates the problem—another case of market failure. On the other hand, the
courts do sometimes grant class certification contingent on some maximum number
of opt outs. Thus, it might be possible for index funds to subvert many class actions.
But that would leave those with large claims—such as hedge funds—to collect from
31. See Richard A. Booth, Why Pay a Fraud Plaintiff to Sue?, WASH. POST (June 26, 2006),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/25/AR2006062500527.html [https://perma.cc/ZJH8-QZS5];
Peter Elkind, The Fall of America’s Meanest Law Firm, CNN MONEY (Nov. 3, 2006),
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/13/8393127/
[https://perma.cc/UFM6-ZZ2D].
32. See generally Richard A. Booth, Things Happen, 55 VILL. L. REV. 57 (2010). Although
much has been made of ABACUS as an example of Wall Street venality, one can make a case for
why ABACUS might have been a good thing for the markets and the economy in general. By
creating a vehicle that permitted investors to go short in mortgage backed securities, it might have
been possible to control the overheated housing market. Some such thought may have prompted
Lloyd Blankfein to state to Congress that the firm was doing God’s work. In any event, the fact
that GS itself assumed the risk of default by writing credit default swaps on ABACUS belies the
idea that the product was created for the purpose of generating losses.
33. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 631 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated and
remanded, 140 S. Ct. 592 (Jan. 14, 2020), reinstated 962 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2020) (construing fiduciary
duty of retirement plan trustees under ERISA).
34. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1017–20 (1994).
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defendant companies without the need to share the pot with small investors. Indeed,
high-rollers have begun to opt out of class actions in recent years—because by doing
so they are free to settle without court approval and need not share the proceeds
with small investors—a practice that is worrisome in its own way. 35 Another
possibility is that the courts might recharacterize class actions as derivative actions
on their own motion because it is up to the courts to decide whether a claim is direct
or derivative. It is a matter of law akin to subject matter jurisdiction. But courts do
not like to act other than at the behest of litigants. Nevertheless, a woke court might
ask the parties to brief the question.
A much more promising strategy is for big investors to intervene and urge the
courts to deny class certification—as well as enjoin independent direct actions by
large claimants—until any derivative action is resolved. It will not suffice for the
court simply to acknowledge the existence of a parallel derivative action (which is
pretty much what happens anyway). 36 As shown here, the argument to be made is
complicated. It will not be easy to persuade a court to do the right thing—to address
the derivative action first and exclusively—because the well-established practice is
precisely the opposite. Moreover, the class action is (and must be) litigated in federal
court while the derivative action is typically litigated in state court (and often cannot
be litigated in federal court). So, the federal court must be persuaded to defer to the
state court. Given these complications, it is important that the arguments be made
by someone with a genuine feel for the position to be maintained. Index funds are
by far best constituted to make the case—both against a class action and for a
derivative action—for all the reasons explained here about why class actions disserve
deserving diversified investors. Ironically, index funds have been criticized for their
failure to take the lead in prosecuting securities fraud class actions. 37 The critics see
it as a simple case of free-riding (shirking) on the efforts of so-called quality
shareholders. The supposedly sinister story is that investors invest in index funds
because they offer maximum diversification with the lowest possible management
fees. Thus, the theory is that index funds can offer rock-bottom fees because they
shirk their responsibilities as stockholders. They fail in their duty to be good
corporate stewards.38 But the inconvenient truth is that index funds should be

35. The practice raises nice questions about whether some claims ought to be prosecuted as
class actions for the benefit of small investors. But (again) these questions can be avoided
altogether if we proceed first by derivative action thus assuring that the benefit of a remedy is
shared pro rata by all. Accordingly, there is no right to opt out of a derivative action.
Incidentally, the same is true of class actions other than those for damages under FRCP 23(b)(3).
36. Note that a derivative action based on the same allegations as made in Goldman Sachs (as
well as some others) was filed and dismissed by the Delaware Chancery Court in 2011. See In re
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., Civil Action No. CIV.A., 5215-VCG, 2011 WL
4826104, at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011). Arguably, that decision should be res judicata with
regard to the case pending before SCOTUS although one must jump through numerous doctrinal
hoops to reach that conclusion. Similar thorny (but fascinating) legal questions arise under FRCP
23 in deciding whether a particular case should fall in a particular subpart of the rule. See, e.g., WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (supposed claim for declaratory relief under
FRCP 23(b)(2) should be treated instead as claim for individual damages under FRCP 23(b)(3)
but could not be certified thereunder for because individual questions predominate).
37. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019).
38. It is difficult to miss the religious overtones (guilt trip) in this thesis. See Luke 16:1–13.
It has also been suggested that index funds might even be operated at a loss in order to gain
market share for the management firm (which often runs other funds as well) thus to gain better
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positively opposed to class actions. They should prefer that the remedy be abolished
if they thought hard enough about it. So, an index fund would not make a good
lead plaintiff anyway. Nevertheless, it is true that the logic of indexing dictates that
fund expenses be kept as low as possible. It would not be costless for an index fund
to serve as lead plaintiff in a derivative action. On the other hand, the benefits may
be significant. Replacing class actions with derivative actions could generate more
than $300 billion in aggregate market capitalization. 39
This is not to say that all will be well if only index funds make the right
arguments. There is every reason to expect opposition to any initiative to promote
derivative actions over class actions. For example, class counsel might argue that
index funds should be excluded from the class. The argument has some merit, but
it also runs counter to the FOTM doctrine. On the one hand, index investors
implicitly trust in the integrity of the market and are thus the very definition of an
investor that FOTM seeks to serve. Nevertheless, the practice of indexing entails
buying stocks that have risen in value and selling stocks that have fallen in value.
Thus, one might argue that index funds make it a practice to buy high and sell low—
which is quite the opposite of what stock-pickers do. Thus, it might be argued that
even though index investors rely on market prices in some sense, they also implicitly
advocate against reliance on the information that is provided by the federal scheme
of securities regulation in that they abjure any effort to choose stocks based thereon
while depending on the efforts of others to do so. In other words, they positively
advocate ignoring the substance of disclosure and so should be excluded from the
definition of any plaintiff class.40 Undoubtedly, there will be other such obstacles
and other such issues to be resolved before we reach the promised land of a legal
system mostly free from securities fraud class actions. It is possible that SCOTUS
could get us one step closer when it decides the Goldman Sachs case by vacating the
decision below to certify the action as a class action—with instructions to consider
evidence of price impact relating solely to correction of alleged price inflation. That
would go some distance toward the goal since it implies that only this narrow
element of loss is compensable. The Court could arguably do so since the narrow
issue presented is whether the plaintiff has any burden to offer positive evidence of
price impact following rebuttal. It would seem to go without saying that the Court
is thus licensed to discuss the object of the evidence—what it must tend to prove.
Indeed, it would seem difficult to discuss the matter without also discussing exactly
what is to be presumed. But then again, the issue of how a rebuttable presumption
works applies in all sorts of settings. So, the Court may want to avoid tying what it
says too closely to the subject matter of securities fraud class actions. Thus,
SCOTUS may punt by ruling that the trial court retains the discretion to evaluate
the significance of rebuttal evidence in light of the import of the proposition to be
presumed in the context of the case or controversy to be resolved so as to avoid any
hard and fast rule that the plaintiff must (or need not) offer reply evidence. If I were
(private) access to information from portfolio companies. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 37, at
2051–59.
39. See Richard A. Booth, Stock Drop Preface (Jul. 8, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
40. While this argument may sound a bit strained, a variation thereon has been accepted by
the courts. See generally GAMCO Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 838 F.3d 214 (2d Cir.
2016) (finding that presumption of reliance was rebutted as to investor that touted a proprietary
investment model).
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inclined to bet on the outcome, that is the bet I would make. I suppose I would be
happy to win, but it would be a missed opportunity make some real progress toward
fixing our dysfunctional system of securities litigation.
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